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Edward
M. Stern, J.D., has a private law practice in Newtonville, Mass.
Stern serves as assistant dean for pre-law advising at Boston
University and is a visiting lecturer for the University of
Massachusetts/Boston Department of Sociology. |
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By Edward Stern, J.D.
The Sept. 10 edition of Lawyers USA recently reported the case
of State v. Matavale, (Hawaii) The full text can be found at lawyersusaonline.
com.
The case arose with a mother using a plastic backpack, a plastic
hanger, and a car brush, to strike her 14-year-old daughter who
was described as 5'4" or 5'5" and 150 or 154 pounds. The mother
was described as physically larger than the daughter.
The mother claimed and the daughter agreed, that the daughter lied
about working with a tutor. When she was supposed to be at the tutoring
sessions, she had gone to the mall. The daughter allegedly also
lied about her report card. The mother admitted to being angry and
concerned that her daughter might not pass her classes and was "trying
to teach her daughter a lesson."
The hanger left marks that were reported by the child's school
to the appropriate social services agency. The child testified that
she did not feel unsafe in her home. There were small bruises but
no welts, fractures or scratches.
The mother was convicted by a jury of the offense of abuse of family
or household members. She appealed. Her grounds, in part, were that
there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that her conduct was not justified as parental discipline.
In its decision, the court referred to a parent's right to direct
his/her child's upbringing as found in federal and Hawaii's constitutions.
Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho noted however, that although a parent
has a privilege to use reasonable or moderate physical force to
control behavior, there is no absolute constitutional right to strike
a child. The state, however, in the interest of protecting the child's
welfare, has a right to limit parental freedom in raising their
children. To this end, the Massachusetts legislature has carved
out a law, HRS § 703-309 (1), recognizing a parent's privilege to
exercise physical control over a child so long as it does not result
in harm to the child.
The lower court ruling was vacated and the conviction and sentence
were reversed. There was a dissent filed by the two judges who would
have upheld the jury's conviction although in the decision the dissent
stated: "Most assuredly, even the most pious of parents are susceptible
to the unique aggravations caused by the disrespect, disobedience
or deception of their offspring, capable of triggering an uncharacteristic
parental reaction."
Many states have dealt with this troubling, evolving issue. In
the past, children were dominated by the wishes of their parents,
and parents had almost complete control over the children's upbringing.
Over time, there's been some modification to limit possible abuse.
Abuse is difficult to define except in the extreme. Abuse, which
causes permanent harm, particularly permanent physical harm, is
not permitted today. However, in the physical harm area, less than
broken bones or permanent harm is more difficult to monitor.
In 2005, in Massachusetts in the case of Commonwealth v. Rubeck,
the defendant was convicted by a jury of assault and battery on
her two-year-old son.
The incident occurred in the Valley Medical Group waiting room.
Rubeck, accompanied by her son, drove a friend, Colleen Barber,
to a medical appointment. In the waiting area, the son began to
misbehave.
Reportedly, the child began to run around, jump up and down and
whine. His mother responded by yelling at him, grabbing him, pulling
him over to her and saying such things as "shut up, be quiet, sit
down." The child responded, "I don't wanna" and other "whiny" statements.
Rubeck put her foot on the child's foot, pulled him closer and said,
"If you don't stop it now, we're going out to the car and you'll
be there, alone, with me." The child immediately became quiet and
"looked afraid." The child then resumed jumping and running. Rubeck
responded by grabbing the child by the collar and yanking him toward
her while saying, "Shut up, stop it."
According to the prosecution, Rubeck grabbed the child by the arms,
shook him and threw him down into the chair, a distance of "a couple
of feet." The child was thrown "with force that you don't use on
a child that age," in a manner that was "too aggressive for a two-year-old."
The child was crying as Rubeck was yelling in a voice that became
progressively louder. She appeared frustrated with the child and
"out of control." Patients waiting to be seen asked medical personnel
at the office to intervene. Rubeck took the child outside. The police
were called and responded, taking statements from several witnesses.
In Rubeck's defense, her friend, Barber, denied that Rubeck hit
the child or threw the child into the chair and stated that when
Rubeck put the child in the chair, "He would get up and start acting
out again and throwing papers up in the air…. He just kept saying,
'No, I'm not going to sit, Mommy.' He kept saying no, when his mother
kept saying, 'okay, come on, sit.'" Barber further testified that
Rubeck was not yelling, but, rather, was "talking in a normal voice."
On cross-examination, Barber denied the prosecutor's statement that
Rubeck "forcefully put the child in the chair" stating that she
didn't throw him in the chair but put him in the chair saying, 'okay,
…here, sit.'"
In the Commonwealth v. Rubeck, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
discussed two prior cases which served as direction for the Dept.
of Social Services in Massachusetts:
"The right of parents to use reasonable force to discipline children
was most recently discussed in Commonwealth v. Torres. There, the
defendant complained that no instruction had been given regarding
a parent's "privilege to use reasonable force when disciplining
her children." The court held that, because the mother's abuse of
her young children was so extreme that her actions could not possibly
come within any privilege, no such instruction was warranted.
In Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Servs., (1999),
the court ruled that a parent's spanking of a nine-year-old child
with a leather belt, delivering one or two (and no more than five)
blows to the child's fully clothed buttocks in a nonviolent and
controlled manner and not in anger, and leaving slightly pink marks
with no bruising, combined with an explanation of the reason for
the punishment and expressions of caring, did not constitute abuse
as defined in the Department of Social Services regulations as set
out in 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.00 (1996). The court noted that
the regulations, promulgated pursuant to authority granted in G.L.
c. 119, § 51B(8), "clearly draw a line between permissible physical
discipline and prohibited abuse," as the regulations clearly specify
the types of physical injuries that may not be inflicted on children.
A footnote in Commission v. Aubech states: "The use of physical
force [in chastisement] by a parent is privileged only when it is
used for the 'training or education of the child or for the preservation
of discipline.' (Restatement, Tots 2d, § 151 [(1965)].) When the
child does not have the capacity to understand or appreciate the
correction, the value of the training, education or discipline is
lost upon him and, therefore, the parental privilege of the use
of physical force is negated."
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that it is better
not to strike your children at all. If you do and there are sufficient
marks or there are witnesses, which will result in reporting the
incident, then a parent will be investigated and perhaps tried.
No one "wins" in these cases. The child may have to testify against
the parent. Even if the parent prevails, there is the time, the
expense and the embarrassment. Additionally, if a child is removed
from the parent's care, does the state have a better alternative
for the child? One assumes and hopes this last question is answered
in the affirmative if a child is truly at present and/or future
risk of long-term harm.
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